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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand 
against the paramount interests of the community. . . .  It remains 
only for the claims of the community to be put forward with clarity 
and force.1 
This radical statement encapsulates one of the key themes of Adolf 
Berle’s work: stockholders no longer had a role in the corporation that 
entitled them to extensive claims in the corporation.  Heralded in The 
Modern Corporation, his reconceptualization of the nature of ownership 
in the context of shareholding was based on empirical data on the mas-
sive level of share dispersal in America’s largest corporations.2  Stock-
holders had become too numerous and too dispersed to exercise control 
over “their” corporation.  Instead, managers—the paid employees of the 
company—controlled the corporations.  In this new arrangement, where 
business was dominated by management-controlled organizations as op-
posed to owner-controlled organizations—a shift dubbed by Berle as a 
“revolution”3—new guiding principles for corporations needed to be 
drawn.  In this new corporate order the state was required to take the lead 
to achieve a morally correct balance of interests, a balance which rele-
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 1. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
312 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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gated to the community both the longstanding interests of stockholders 
and the new control possessed by corporate managers.4 
According to Berle in The Modern Corporation, these shifts in 
ownership and control meant that shareholder primacy models for the 
corporation were outdated: they were based on an outdated model of 
ownership and entitlement.5  Shareholder ownership claims should no 
longer operate as the guiding force behind governance and corporate 
goals because the nature of that ownership had changed.6  In the modern 
corporation, Berle argued, stock ownership had become a “passive” ar-
rangement that was devoid of “spiritual values” and creative input.  The 
owners were not able to directly employ their wealth and its value was 
dependent on outside forces.7  Through such mechanisms as limited lia-
bility, the owners of stock, unlike the owners of tangible property such as 
land, bore little responsibility for their property.  Correspondingly, own-
ers of stock could not demand the extensive rights generally attributed to 
private property.  Shareholder ownership claims were much more limited 
and were subject to wider community interest.  Accordingly, sharehold-
ers were entitled to maintain the liquidity of their assets, protect their 
assets’ unrestricted transferability, and have clear, accurate information 
on their assets’ value—indeed, most of the protections suggested by 
Berle in his earlier Harvard Law Review piece.8  However, shareholders’ 
limited relationship and responsibility for their property correspondingly 
limited their claims.  In other words, Berle attributed different normative 
values to different levels of ownership. 
Thus, for Berle, when the large corporation separated ownership 
from control, “ownership” became a smaller bundle of legal rights that 
had an historical relationship with property rights but were not property 
rights themselves.9  Stock property was, by its nature, more social than 
private and its owners could no longer claim private property-type rights.  
The normative values attributable to this level of property were small 
claims to modest returns after the claims of the community, particularly 
labour, had been met. 
                                                            
 4. See J.R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, What’s 
So Special about Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994).  This article discusses some of the 
policy issues that arose from the Berle-Dodd debate. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Such sentiments have been voiced in a number of different ways.  See Jane Wills, A Stake in 
Place? The Geography of Employee Ownership and Its Implications for a Stakeholding Society, 23 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 79 (1998). 
 7. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 79. 
 8. See Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
(1932). 
 9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 297. 
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In the United Kingdom, this radical theme in Berle’s work has been 
lost.  Generally, Berle is cited as an early commentator on share dispersal 
and the resulting problem of director accountability.  This emphasis is 
particularly misleading, as it gives the impression that Berle was con-
cerned with re-empowering shareholders to act as a bulwark against 
management power and also enabling them to assert their proper claims 
as owners.  However, while Berle probably maintained a lifelong ambi-
valence to management power,10 it seems clear from his work in and af-
ter The Modern Corporation that he was not concerned with re-
empowering shareholders.  That ship had sailed and society was the bet-
ter for it.  So why has British scholarship, law, and policy been so blind 
to the radical theme of downgraded shareholder claims? 
This paper offers some tentative suggestions as to why Berle’s 
work has been read and interpreted so selectively in the United Kingdom.  
I suggest that this must be partly attributable to the historical develop-
ments in English company law that entrenched the notion of shareholder 
ownership claims.  Specifically, unincorporated associations’ normative 
values—that members are owners and there is no distinction between 
small organizations with no share dispersal and large organizations with 
wide share dispersal—have a continuing influence on this entrenched 
notion of shareholder ownership claims.  Part II will provide an overview 
of the origins of English company law.  Part III will address how the 
Bubble Act encouraged unincorporated businesses and shareholder pri-
macy.  Part IV will discuss the influence of unincorporated business con-
cepts in the early Companies Acts.  Finally, Part V will conclude: Berle 
theorized that the disconnect between shareholder and company resulted 
in low shareholder entitlement and a corresponding “un-owned-ness” of 
the company; he further theorized that this could be the basis for social 
reforms.  However, this was not the outcome in Britain.  Instead, share 
dispersal was not a sufficient condition for the reconceptualization of 
ownership in Britain, given the strength of the legal shareholder entitle-
ment model.  A future article will build upon this thesis and will show 
that this model was only challengeable given the set of wider social re-
forms introduced in the post-war period. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH CORPORATE LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
The rudimentary beginnings of company law can be traced to the 
seventeenth century.  Before that time, incorporation did not originally 
designate a form that was particularly distinct from an unincorporated 
                                                            
 10. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Ori-
gins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). 
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form.11  Business associations were merely formed through different 
mechanisms, with some resulting in an incorporated association and 
some resulting in an unincorporated association.  Incorporation was 
achieved through the grant of a charter by the crown12 or, after the Eng-
lish revolution, by an Act of parliament.13  Statutes were also used to ex-
tend the powers of the Royal prerogative so that they could grant charters 
with enhanced privileges.14  Unincorporated associations, in contrast, 
were formed through differing levels of informal understandings.  How-
ever, in terms of their post-formation characteristics, there were no sig-
nificant differences between the two forms. 
The first corporate form existed as a nexus of contracts and bore lit-
tle resemblance to corporations as we know them today.  Members of 
incorporated associations frequently made partnership arrangements be-
tween themselves, thus operating as unincorporated associations under 
the umbrella of a body corporate.  For example, medieval guilds, which 
were associations of craftsmen in a particular trade, frequently sought 
incorporation in order to secure a monopoly over their trade.  However, a 
guild’s members would then often form unincorporated associations op-
erating within the corporate body.15  As early as the fourteenth century, 
merchant traders sought charters in order to secure monopoly trading 
rights.  Like the medieval guilds, traders entered into agreements with 
each other as unincorporated merchant trading associations operating 
under the body corporate.  The most famous among these charter compa-
                                                            
 11. Paddy Ireland et al., The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law, 14 J.L. SOC’Y 
1 (1987).  This article indicates the lack of distinction between shares in incorporated companies and 
shares in unincorporated companies during the period before the end of the nineteenth century. 
 12. Until the reformation, incorporation could also be conferred upon English religious bodies 
by the Pope.  Dewey argues that the notion of fiction in respect to corporate personality originated 
with Pope Innocent IV, who sought to thwart the political power to punish ecclesiastical bodies by 
conceptualizing them as fictions incapable of guilt or liabilities.  See John Dewey, The Historical 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926). 
 13. Following the English Revolution, incorporation could also be achieved through statute; 
however, this route was not popular until the end of the eighteenth century.  See PAUL L. DAVIES & 
L.C.B. GOWER, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 19 (Sweet & Maxwell 1997). 
 14. It did this in the case of the Bank of England and the South Sea Company.  See generally 
Peter Temin & Hans-Joachim Voth, Riding the South Sea Bubble, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (2004); 
Julian Hoppit, The Myths of the South Sea Bubble, 12 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 
141 (2002); Ron Harris, The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business Organization, 54 J. 
ECON. HIST. 610 (1994). 
 15. See Harris, supra note 14.  Such associations or partnerships within the guilds fell into two 
identifiable forms.  The first, the commenda, described an agreement where a financier of a trader 
was rewarded with a share of the profits rather than an agreed interest rate—much in the way of a 
sleeping partner.  The latter form of partnership, societas, was akin to the modern partnership in that 
it was more permanent, the liability of partners was unlimited, and each partner was agent of the 
other.  Id. 
2010] Enumerating Old Themes? 1205 
nies was the East India Company.16  The East India Company began trad-
ing in 1600 with a membership comprised of both sole traders and part-
nerships that invested in joint stock with joint liability that terminated 
upon the completion of a particular voyage.17  By 1652, permanent joint 
stock was introduced, but this coexisted with private trading until 1692 
when the latter practice was discontinued.18  During this period the in-
corporated body had an identity,19 the East India Company, but it acted 
as an umbrella for a number of different commercial arrangements be-
tween persons.  Thus, unlike the modern company, it really did exist as a 
nexus of contracts.20 
The Bubble Act of 172021 subsequently conceptualized the incorpo-
rated company as a more distinct form.  However, by the time it had 
done so, incorporation had already lost its popularity.  In its place, the 
unincorporated form dominated business.  The marginalization of the 
incorporated form meant that when the legislature sought to make incor-
porations accessible to all shades of business through the Joint Stock 
Companies Registration Act of 184422 (1844 Act).  The Act described 
the new registered company in terms which actually described the domi-
nant unincorporated forms: the partnership and the Deed of Settlement 
Company.23  These post-Bubble Act unincorporated forms were distin-
guishable from the incorporated forms of this period24 in a number of key 
respects.  First, both the partnership and the Deed of Settlement Compa-
ny were private legal arrangements between individuals.  They were not, 
like the companies incorporated by charters, concessions from the state 
                                                            
 16. See C.E. Walker, The History of the Joint Stock Company, 6 ACCT. REV. 97 (1931). 
 17. DAVIES & GOWER, supra note 13, at ch. 1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Murray A. Pickering, The Company as a Separate Entity, 31 MOD. L. REV. 481 (1968). 
 20. It is interesting to note that Jensen and Meckling’s new concept of the corporation as just a 
“nexus of contracts” is radically out of date—it describes arrangements which ceased to exist by the 
nineteenth century.  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON 305 (1976); see also Mel-
vin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature 
of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999). 
 21. This Act was originally known as the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation 
Act of 1719.  The Act’s full title is “An Act for better securing certain Powers and Privileges, in-
tended to be granted by His Majesty by Two Charters, for Assurance of Ships and Merchandize at 
Sea, and for lending Money upon Bottomry; and for restraining several extravagant and unwarranta-
ble Practices therein mentioned.”  Frank Evans, The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Limited 
Trading Company, 8 COL. L. REV. 339, 353 (1908) (quoting 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Eng.)). 
 22. 7 & 8 Vict., c. 109, 110 (Eng.). 
 23. See Geoffrey Todd, Some Aspects of Joint Stock Companies, 1844–1900, 4 ECON. HIST. 
REV. 46 (1932). 
 24. These incorporated forms differed from the new form of incorporation, which emerged in 
the end of the nineteenth century. 
1206 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
with all of those implied public responsibilities.25  Second, they 
represented the property interests of the members who had contracted for 
self-interested commercial motives only.  Furthermore, and in contrast to 
members of the later nineteenth-century incorporated forms,26 members 
of these types of unincorporated forms were owners of the whole under-
taking and thus had the expectations, responsibilities, and claims of pri-
vate property owners.27 
III.  CORPORATE LAW, THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY, AND THE BUBBLE 
ACT 
By the late seventeenth century, permanent joint stock, exchanging 
in an active market as a liquid asset, was beginning to emerge.28  This 
type of stock was much more akin to our modern company share, and 
such a development might have heralded modern English company law 
were it not for the activities of the South Sea Company, a charter compa-
ny that traded in South America during the 1700s.  The South Sea Com-
pany’s collapse at the end of 1720 and the catastrophic speculative bub-
ble it inflated led to the large-scale abandonment of the incorporated 
form by businessmen and the contraction of the stock market.29  At the 
same time, parliament passed a number of acts to regulate and limit the 
market in shares, including the Bubble Act.30  Because of the events fol-
lowing the collapse of the South Sea Company, it was not until the nine-
teenth century that business regained its interest in the stock market.31 
A.  The South Sea Company 
The South Sea Company’s scheme to buy government debt was ap-
proved by Parliament in April 1720.  One of the key aspects of this 
scheme involved persuading the holders of government bonds and de-
                                                            
 25. For a full discussion of the Concession Theory, see J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER 
AND RESPONSIBILITY (Oxford University Press 1993); see generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1989); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). 
 26. In modern corporate law, the company has a separate legal personality and shares of stock 
are titles to revenue, not claims to the whole undertaking. 
 27. L.C.B. Gower, The English Private Company, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 535 (1953). 
 28. 2 WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND 
IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 (1910). 
 29. See A. B. DUBOIS, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT 1720–1800 
(Commonwealth Fund 1938). 
 30. The most significant of these acts were passed in 1734, 7 Geo. 2, c. 8, and in 1737, 10 Geo. 
2, c.8.  However, a number of acts had been passed in 1697 and 1708, prior to the Bubble Act.  8 & 
9 Will. 3, c. 32 (Eng.); 6 Ann., c. 68 (Eng.). 
 31. See R. C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY (Oxford Univ. Press 
1999). 
2010] Enumerating Old Themes? 1207 
bentures to exchange them for South Sea Company shares.32  In order to 
persuade bond holders that these shares were highly valuable commodi-
ties, the directors needed to push up the share price.  And, as the compa-
ny did no real trade, this could only be achieved by legal device, hype, 
and extravagant claims designed to create demand.33  The South Sea 
Company set up an imaginative financial scheme which appeared to 
create money out of nothing.  It funded dividends from new issues and 
offered interest-free loans to buy shares.  Through these and other strate-
gies, the company hoped to circulate investors’ money profitably and 
indefinitely.34  The speculative nature of this activity in which nothing of 
value was being created meant that share price represented shareholders’ 
demand only.  That demand was based on the shareholders’ belief that 
the company was making real value, although that belief was utterly 
misguided.  When shareholder belief in share value vastly exceeds real 
value because of, for example, successful hype, share prices are known 
as “bubbles.”  Bubbles are an apt metaphor because bubbles are delicate 
and they have little substance for the space that they fill—and when the 
air that puffs them up eventually stretches their material reality/fabric too 
much, they will burst. 
The success of the South Sea Company spawned a general clamor 
to buy shares in other companies and unincorporated associations that 
had equally dubious business purposes.35  The other companies’ inflated 
stock prices created “mini-bubbles” that threatened the South Sea Com-
pany’s bubble and profits.  As a result, the directors and those involved 
in the South Sea Company sought government intervention. 
B. The Bubble Act and Its Effects 
In response to the South Sea Company’s pleas for help, the gov-
ernment passed the hastily-drafted Bubble Act, which prohibited the sale 
of freely transferable shares by associations operating without a charter.36  
The South Sea Company hoped that the more restricted availability of 
                                                            
 32. See MALCOLM BALEN, A VERY ENGLISH DECEIT: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 
SEA BUBBLE AND THE FIRST GREAT FINANCIAL SCANDAL (Fourth Estate Ltd. 2003). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally Ron Harris, Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions, and the 
Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825, 50 ECON. HIST. REV. 675 (1997). 
 36. See Bubble Act, supra note 21.  The Act prohibited the raising of freely transferable stock 
without a charter, an emphasis which allowed the later growth of organizations that had some restric-
tion on the transferability of stock.  Id. 
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shares in the market would further enhance the value of the company’s 
shares.37 
Instead, the Bubble Act had a very different effect.  The fearsome 
tone of the legislation undermined public confidence in share trading per 
se.38  So even though the Act gave a temporary boost to the South Sea 
Company, after just a few more months of trading, the company’s share 
price collapsed, and with it, the national economy.39  As a result of this 
financial catastrophe, the Bubble Act—conceived as a short-term de-
vice—stayed on the statute books for one hundred and five years.  That 
was the first unintended consequence of the Bubble Act.40 
The second unintended effect of the Act was to conceptually sever 
the unincorporated association from the incorporated company.41  As 
previously noted, the legal distinction between incorporated and unin-
corporated associations had not been clearly defined.  Partnerships 
formed and confirmed under seal could provide for the division of inter-
ests into shares whose transferability was determined according to the 
terms of the partnership agreement.  Many of the joint stock “companies” 
selling shares and contributing to the financial bubble were in fact unin-
corporated associations.  This, of course, accounted for the prohibition 
against unincorporated companies in the Bubble Act.42 
The third unintended effect was to enhance the role of unincorpo-
rated associations in the emerging English capitalist economy.43  After 
the financial collapse exacerbated by the Bubble Act, the English gov-
                                                            
 37. There are a number of different perspectives on the passage of the Bubble Act.  Some 
commentators have mistakenly identified its passage as a reaction to the collapse of the South Sea 
Company.  See SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (Univ. 
of Chicago Press 1979) (1765).  These comments have had a huge impact on thinking about this 
issue.  Scott views it as a more general attempt to control speculation in shares.  See SCOTT, supra 
note 28.  More recently, the Act has been discussed as a mechanism for legislatures to achieve high-
er rents by enhancing charter use, similar to legislative rent seeking in the nineteenth century Ameri-
ca.  See Henry N. Butler, General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of 
Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON 169 (1986).  This article does not 
attempt to assess these perspectives; instead, it follows the more generally accepted and historically 
verifiable line that the Act was concocted by Parliament to protect the South Sea Company. 
 38. See Harris, supra note 14.  Harris argues that because the Act was passed on June 11th—
and South Sea Company shares peaked on June 24th before sliding in August and collapsing in 
September—the Act itself cannot be blamed for the company’s collapse.  However, while it certainly 
was true that the company’s failure was, at its core, due to the speculative nature of the scheme 
itself, the rapid decline after the Act cannot discount it is as being contributory to its speed of col-
lapse.  Id. 
 39. See generally Harris, supra note 14; see also DUBOIS, supra note 29. 
 40. Margaret Patterson & David Reiffen, The Effect of the Bubble Act on the Market for Joint 
Stock Shares, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 163 (1990). 
 41. See DUBOIS, supra note 29. 
 42. See Harris, supra note 14. 
 43. See DUBOIS, supra note 29. 
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ernment’s shock and embarrassment made it generally averse to granting 
charters of incorporation.44  The raising of joint stock had been described 
in the Act as “dangerous and mischievous to trade,” and the ensuing fi-
nancial collapse of the South Sea Company seemed to evidence the truth 
of that statement.45  Companies with freely transferable shares were 
treated with suspicion by the public and by the government alike, and 
unincorporated associations became the preferred choice for business.46  
The uneasiness about how to apply the Bubble Act had one final unin-
tended consequence: it created the company lawyer.47  Businesses in-
creasingly sought legal advice on the Act’s applicability to their business 
and relied on lawyers to draft Bubble Act-compliant business struc-
tures.48  As such, businesses became dependent on lawyers, who in turn 
developed their skills as business organization lawyers.  In the Bubble-
Act era, businesses increasingly called upon lawyers to construct compli-
cated forms of unincorporated business organizations that could perform 
most of the desirable functions of incorporated bodies while remaining 
Bubble-Act compliant.  The Deed of Settlement Company successfully 
performed this function.49  Here, a company would be formed under a 
deed of settlement whereby the subscribers agreed to be associated with 
the company and held shares in accordance with the terms of the deed.50  
The property of the company was held by a body of trustees.  Simple 
partnerships remained popular for small and medium-sized businesses 
and the common law honed partnership law as a result.  Paradoxically, an 
Act that was designed to suppress the use of unincorporated business 
associations resulted in encouraging their proliferation: 
The Bubble Act had decreed a “new deal” for organized business, 
but the moral tone of the eighteenth century was not sufficiently ad-
vanced to appreciate the benefits of the new dispensation.  In con-
sequence, entrepreneurs and their legal advisors turned to the device 
                                                            
 44. Id. 
 45. See Bubble Act, supra note 21.  In contrast to Parliament, the English judiciary was more 
sympathetic to those trading in shares.  The first prosecution was in 1808 and it was unsuccessful.  
Rex v. Dodd, 9 East 527. 
 46. See Bishop C. Hunt, The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1830–1844, 43 J. POL. ECON. 
331 (1935).  Hunt examines the deep-set anxiety felt by British businesses regarding the corporate 
form in the early nineteenth century.  However, as DuBois points out, the judiciary became more 
flexible in their approach to the Bubble Act after some years.  See DUBOIS, supra note 29. 
 47. See DUBOIS, supra note 29. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY 
LAW (Sweet & Maxwell 1923). 
 50. Id.; see generally BISHOP C. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
ENGLAND, 1800–1867 (Harvard Univ. Press 1936). 
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of the unincorporated association to affect their ends, and in this 
they were remarkably successful.51 
C. Post-Bubble Act Unincorporated Businesses: The Reason for 
Enduring Shareholder Primacy 
In the Bubble Act era, businesses generally operated as unincorpo-
rated associations.52  Although businesses could be incorporated by an 
Act of parliament or through a charter grant, incorporation was only used 
for prestigious or quasi-public activities.  The generalized use of unin-
corporated forms in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, coupled with 
the early tendency to merge these forms with incorporated forms, ex-
plains to a significant degree the enduring power of the shareholder pri-
macy model in the United Kingdom today.53 
As the legal norms relating to unincorporated associations began to 
merge with those of incorporated associations, the legal concepts that 
distinguished the two forms began to blur together.  Historically, this 
developed through a number of points of contact between unincorporated 
and incorporated associations.  For example, unincorporated associa-
tions’ ownership norms simply continued as incorporated business’s 
norms, even though this was a time when the two forms should have log-
ically developed a new set of norms. 
First, as noted earlier, prior to the Bubble Act, members of incorpo-
rated companies also operated as partners inter se.  Partners were unders-
tood in common law to be co-owners of the partnership’s property, to be 
jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debts, and to have a pri-
ma facie equal claim to profits and to operational control.54  For example, 
members of guild charter companies and early merchant trading associa-
tions often operated as both members of an incorporated company and as 
partners inter se.  Thus, incorporated associations were frequently operat-
ing as a holding body for many unincorporated associations.  Additional-
ly, before the Bubble Act, nearly all joint stock companies were unincor-
porated.  Thus, companies had a long-standing tradition of owners who 
shared the characteristics of partners in the emerging law on partner-
ships.  Unincorporated and incorporated associations were called “com-
panies” and these business forms organized in an interconnecting fa-
shion. 
                                                            
 51. See DUBOIS, supra note 29, at 216. 
 52. See Harris, supra note 14. 
 53. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). 
 54. These principles are now consolidated in statute form and remain in force today.  Partner-
ship Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. (Eng.). 
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Second, both before and after the Bubble Act, joint stock compa-
nies were associations of people bound together by joint liability and 
joint ownership regardless of whether they were incorporated or unin-
corporated.55  Under common law, members of all companies, incorpo-
rated and unincorporated, were conceived as beneficiaries of the compa-
ny’s property.56  According to Harvard academic Samuel Williston, 
shareholders had an equitable interest in both the company’s tangible 
assets and profits.57  Each share, therefore, was an equitable claim to the 
company’s property: “the corporation held its assets as a trustee for the 
shareholders, who were in equity co-owners.”58  In respect to shareholder 
liability for company debts, Williston also showed that unless there were 
very specific reasons not to do so, shareholders were connected (in equi-
ty) to the obligations which the corporation owed to the outside world.59  
This obligation was treated in law as part of a company’s assets and 
could be enforced through equity.60 
The significance of the common law rule on a member’s liability 
for a company’s debts is that it indicates a common understanding that 
the company and the members had a property interest in the same assets 
(and therefore similar liabilities) if those assets became deficits, regard-
less of incorporation.  The common law rules established in English 
courts continued to be applied in America as late as 1826,61 which indi-
cates how persistent the notion of conjoined shareholder and company 
property interests really was.  In England, the separation of the share-
                                                            
 55. See Harris, supra note 14. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. 
L. REV. 105–124, 149–166 (1888). 
 58. Id. at 150.  Furthermore, in cases involving the Statutes of Mortmain and Frauds and trans-
fers involving real estate, which hinged on whether property interest in the shares of stock was realty 
or personalty, Williston found that the nature of the share depended on the nature of the corporate 
property.  Id.  Thus, he concluded, “if the shareholders have in equity the same interest which the 
corporation has at law, a share will be real estate or personalty, according as the corporate property 
is real or personal.”  Id.  In respect to a fraudulent or mistaken transfer of shares, the acquisition by a 
bona fide purchaser for value was protected precisely because shareholders were not legal but equit-
able owners.  Id.  A transfer made without the knowledge of the original shareholders entitled only 
them to relief.  Id.  Williston also cites a case involving the shares of the New River Water Compa-
ny, where the court held that the shares were realty because the company assets were real estate.  See 
L.E. TALBOT, CRITICAL COMPANY LAW, ch. 2 (Routledge-Cavendish 2007). 
 59. Williston, supra note 57, at 150. 
 60. See Salmon v. The Hamborough Co. (1691) 1 Ch. 204 (U.K.).  Likewise, in a 1673 case, 
the judge stated: 
[I]f losses must fall upon the creditors, such losses should be borne by those who were 
members of the company, who best knew their estates and credit, and not by strangers 
who were drawn in to trust the company upon the credit and countenance it had from 
such particular members. 
Williston, supra note 57, at 162 (citing Naylor v. Brown, Finch, 83 (1673)). 
 61. Williston, supra note 57, at 162. 
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holder from the company’s liability was achieved legislatively so that 
there was a specific intention to differentiate an incorporated company 
from an unincorporated association in this respect.62  The common law 
position did not prima facie distinguish the liability of a member of an 
incorporated company from those of an unincorporated association. 
Thus, before the Bubble Act, all companies adhered to the norma-
tive values of unincorporated associations, regardless of size and method 
of legal formation.  The Bubble Act conceptually served those compa-
nies that were incorporated and could therefore sell freely transferable 
shares, and it thus differentiated incorporated forms from those that were 
not.  However, because business rejected the incorporated form as a re-
sult of this Act, the normative values that existed for both forms before 
the Act continued to dominate.  This had huge consequences when the 
legislatures drafted the first Company Registration Acts, which were 
modelled after the dominant unincorporated forms. 
IV.  THE COMPANY REGISTRATION ACTS AND UNINCORPORATED 
NORMS 
A.  Company Registration Acts: Blurring the Lines Between 
Unincorporated and Incorporated Companies 
The Bubble Act was repealed in 1825.  Later, the 1844 Act was in-
troduced to facilitate incorporation through registration, thus potentially 
removing incorporation from the margins of business.63  The 1844 Act 
provides more evidence of the extent that the ownership norms in unin-
corporated associations, particularly partnerships, continued to infect 
incorporated forms.64  The legislation described members in partnership 
terms and described the company constitution in terms which reflected 
Deed of Settlement Companies—in other words, the legislation applied 
unincorporated norms to incorporated associations.  The company consti-
tution (the memorandum and articles of association) was said to bind 
each member as if it was “signed and sealed by each member.”65  Mem-
bers retained full liability for obligations incurred through the company’s 
                                                            
 62. Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133 (Eng.).  Indeed, even today, a company’s 
constitution must state the limitations of its member’s liability.  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 
9(2)(c) (Eng.) [hereinafter Companies Act 2006]. 
 63. Supra note 22.  See M. S. Rix, Company Law: 1844 and To-Day, 55 ECON. J. 242 (1945). 
 64. See HUNT, supra note 50. 
 65. The seal is significant because it was a continuation of the practices of Deed of Settlement 
companies and unincorporated associations.  Indeed, the constitution continued to be termed as if it 
was a deed until the Companies Act 2006. 
2010] Enumerating Old Themes? 1213 
activities,66 as in partnerships.  Just as partners are liable for a company’s 
debts, under the 1844 Act, members could also be compelled to pay “the 
full payment of all the Debts and Liabilities of such Company or Body, 
and of the Costs of Winding up and finally settling the Affairs of such 
Company or Body.”67  Finally, the Act explicitly implied that companies 
registered under the Act were in fact partnerships by providing that they 
may do such activities as “other Partnerships.”68 
The use of unincorporated association norms in the 1844 Act is un-
surprising given the wider historical context in which the Act was 
passed.  The dispersed share ownership in incorporated companies—
which led Berle to question the nature and claims of shareholders—had 
not yet occurred.  Therefore, there was no reason to discontinue the con-
ceptual merging of incorporated and unincorporated forms any more than 
the Bubble Act had already done.  In this period, business was closely 
held and both ownership and control echoed that of an unincorporated 
form.  For example, the shares in these newly incorporated companies 
were often held in large, oddly-sized values that were not easily transfer-
able and functioned similar to a partnership stake.  Thus, owners of 
shares generally owned a large portion of the business and therefore ex-
ercised a high degree of managerial control.69  This meant that the busi-
nesses newly incorporated under the 1844 Act were much more closely 
akin to partnerships than to the modern company in terms of legal form, 
judicial understanding of share ownership, ownership patterns, and man-
agement.70  Indeed, aside from perpetual succession and the ability to sue 
and be sued as an individual, they were quite unlike modern companies.  
They were closely held organizations without any of the characteristics 
of Berle’s management-controlled organization, which was characterized 
by limited liability, outside ownership, non-shareholding management, 
and shares (titles to revenue exchanging on an active share market). 
Furthermore, although the Limited Liability Act 185571 (consoli-
dated into the Companies Act 1862) might have enhanced outsider own-
ership, it actually had the effect of bringing more quasi-partnership ar-
rangements under the incorporated umbrella.  Because of the connection 
                                                            
 66. Specifically, “any judgement, Decree, or Order for the payment of Money.”  The Joint 
Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, § 25 (Eng.). 
 67. Id. at § 20. 
 68. Id. at § 25; see also Hunt, supra note 46. 
 69. This was not the case for the railroad or banking industries, where incorporation was 
achieved by charter or by a private act. 
 70. Supra note 22.  See Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 
62 MOD. L. REV. 32 (1999); see also Gower, supra note 27. 
 71. The Act allowed members to limit their liability to the value of their fully paid shares. 
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between limited liability72 and unethical business practices, larger, estab-
lished businesses had eschewed its use.73  Conversely, limited liability 
became an attractive option for small businesses74 (and even, famously, 
one man companies) where outsider ownership was not a feature.75  This 
option was attractive because English law, unlike much of continental 
Europe and the United States, did not provide for limited partnerships.76  
The Limited Partnership Act 1907 was comparatively late in coming and 
only provided for limited liability for inactive investing partners.  Thus, 
when incorporation and limited liability through general Acts became 
popular in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was frequently 
used by people whose only access to limited liability was through incor-
poration but who in economic terms were either one man companies or 
small partnerships.77 
B.  Partnership Norms and Share Ownership 
The continued use of the partnership norm in companies of differ-
ent sizes and levels of share dispersal has impacted the legal understand-
ing of the nature of share ownership in England.  There are many tens of 
thousands of companies which are so small that they are described as 
quasi-partnerships because ownership and control is retained by the same 
people.  However, because English common law does not prima facie 
distinguish large companies from small companies, the small companies 
have not been sufficiently conceptually severed from large Berlesian 
companies, particularly in respect to notions of ownership.  Take, for 
example, the classic case of Salomon v. Salomon Co. Ltd. where an (es-
sentially) single shareholder, who was also the only employee, sought to 
avoid personal liability for the company’s debts on the basis that it was a 
                                                            
 72. See generally LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION (Tony Orhnial ed., Routledge 
Kegan & Paul 1982); Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French 
Origins of the American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511 (2003); see also Walker, supra 
note 16. 
 73. See H. A. Shannon, The First Five Thousand Limited Liability Companies and Their Dura-
tion, 4 J. ECON. HIST. 290 (1932).  Shannon notes that the Limited Liability Act was dubbed “The 
Rogues Charter.”  Id.  The response to limited liability can be considered yet another unforeseen 
consequence of the Bubble Act. 
 74. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). 
 75. As Williston notes, although limited liability had been recognised as early as the late seven-
teenth century in cases like Salmon v. The Hamborough Co., (1691) 1 Ch. 204 (U.K.), this was 
mainly to protect the company from the member’s creditors, and did not protect members from the 
company’s debt because of the company’s ongoing right to make levitations or calls for payments 
from its members.  See Williston, supra note 57. 
 76. See Francis M. Burdick, Limited Partnership in America and England, 6 MICH. L. REV. 
525 (1908). 
 77. See Shannon, supra note 73. 
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distinct legal person from himself.  When the Court of Appeal rejected 
the separate corporate personality of Salomon Co. Ltd. because “the leg-
islature never contemplated an extension of limited liability to sole trad-
ers or to a fewer number than seven,”78 the House of Lords was quick to 
point out the fallacy of this position.  Instead of distinguishing between 
large and small companies, the House of Lords pointed out that the num-
ber of subscribers and their involvement with the company was irrelevant 
because none of these members would be liable for the company’s debts 
in a limited liability company.79  Because a company was an entity (ab-
sent fraudulent registration) regardless of the number of members, vast 
areas of doctrinal company law have developed that are legally applica-
ble to all companies, but which are only practically applicable to small 
companies.  There are partnership norms that apply to all companies, but 
these norms are only relevant when a company’s activity is posited on 
relationships of mutual trust.80  Petitions on the basis of unfairly prejudi-
cial conduct, for example, depend on some identifiable relationship be-
tween members of the company which are “partnership–like.”81  Fur-
thermore, statutory mechanisms to regulate the fiduciary duties of share-
holders or to protect minorities invariably apply to small quasi-
partnership companies only.82 
This means that much English company law doctrine encapsulates 
the notion of a participating shareholder, for whom ongoing relationships 
between other members is crucial to the running of the business and who 
maintains a close tie to the company’s management and assets.83  In 
short, it equates shareholders in a company to partners in a partnership—
                                                            
 78. Salomon v. Broderip, (1895) 2 Ch. 323 (U.K.). 
 79. Id.; see also Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidi-
ary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473 (1953). 
 80. See Ross Grantham, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders, 57 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554 (1998). 
 81. See Companies Act 2006, supra note 62, at § 994. 
 82. Companies Act, 2008, c. 46 § 994.  See Bruce v. Carpenter [2006] EWHC 3301 (Ch.); 
Hawkes v. Cuddy [2007] EWHC 2999, [2008] B.C.C. 390 (Ch.).  The Law Commission’s empirical 
research indicated that the more common remedy sought by minority shareholders was for unfairly 
prejudicial conduct under §§ 459–61.  Furthermore, research indicated that this remedy was almost 
exclusively sought by shareholders in very small companies.  Of the court files relating to § 459, 
petitions presented to the Companies Court between January 1994 and December 1996, 233 out of 
254 were inspected.  Of these, 70.4% of the petitioners were minority shareholders and 96.6% in-
volved private companies.  Nearly 34% of petitions involved companies with only two shareholders 
and 48.1% of petitions involved companies with less than five shareholders.  Only 4.3% of petitions 
involved companies with more than ten shareholders.  THE LAW COMMISSION, SHAREHOLDER 
REMEDIES, (1997), No. 246 at 177–78. 
 83. Courts concerned with the statutory contract that exists between company and member 
occasionally held that a contract exists between shareholders inter se.  Rayfield v. Hands [1960] Ch. 
1; Hickman v. Romney Marsh Sheepbreeder’s Ass’n [1915] 1 Ch. 881.  However, in all such cases 
the company was a small, closely held organization.  Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Ltd. [1973] A.C. 360. 
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this is the type of arrangement present in the facts of these cases and the 
quasi-partnership conception of small companies infects the notions of 
companies per se.  In the early period of company law history, the legal 
conception of shareholders as partners or quasi-partners bore a reasona-
ble relationship to prevalent business practice.  However, as shares be-
came more widely dispersed, such conceptions of shareholders should, as 
Berle argued, have been radically reformulated.84  In English law they 
were not. 
This takes us to a curious aspect in the development of English cor-
porate law.  Companies in which shareholding was more dispersed were 
developing contemporaneously with quasi-partnership companies, but 
the property nature of shares was reconceptualized in widely-held com-
panies.  Unlike partnerships, widely-held companies conceptualized their 
shares as personal property.  The modern view of the share as personal 
property was established in Bligh v. Brent.85  In that case, the plaintiff’s 
assertion that the interest of the cestui que trust was co-extensive with 
the legal interest of the trustee was entirely in line with previous authori-
ties.86  Shareholders were equitable owners of the whole undertaking.  
Therefore if the company’s assets were real estate, the shares were realty; 
if the assets were not real estate, the shares were personalty.  However, 
the court held the shares in the company to be personalty rather than real-
ty, regardless of the company’s assets.87  In judgement, Baron Alderton 
stated that shareholders had no claim on the assets—shareholders only 
had claim to the surplus that those assets produced.  He conceptualized 
assets and profits achieved with assets into two different forms of proper-
ty: the company owned the former, and the shareholder owned the latter.  
Thus, in the larger companies, shares were understood as a property dis-
tinct from those interests and claims held by partners.  Shareholders’ in-
terest was becoming a tradable bundle of claims which were detached 
from company assets.88 
Yet despite the reconceptualization of the property nature of share-
holders’ assets, in England it was not accompanied by a reconceptualiza-
                                                            
 84. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 85. Bligh v Brent, (1836) 2 Y. & C. 268.  This case in fact involved a charter company with 
mainly personalty assets.  For an assessment of the implications of this for Williston’s analysis of the 
importance of this case, see TALBOT, supra note 58. 
 86. Williston supra note 57, at 149. 
 87. Under the terms of a will, whether shares were personalty or realty determined who could 
inherit them. 
 88. See Ireland et al., supra note 11.  The authors here noted that Alderton’s view had extended 
to all companies by the 1850s and cite to Sir John Romilly in Poole v. Middleton, 29 Beav. 646 
(1861), who stated that shares in joint stock companies were effectively independent property.  The 
authors also refer to Bacon, who stated that shares were no longer personal actionable rights, but 
were instead “freehold property.”  Ireland, et al., supra note 11, at 159. 
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tion of the nature of shareholder’s claims and entitlement.  Shareholders 
were still conceived as owners with the entitlement of owners, which 
seems to be more extensive than mere ownership of shares.89  And, while 
in modern corporate law it is fully accepted that shareholders do not own 
the company assets, company doctrine still maintains the seemingly pa-
radoxical position that shareholders are the owners even though they 
have no insurable interest in the company.90 
Companies in the United Kingdom may be either small quasi-
partnership companies with no outside share dispersal or large Berlesian 
organizations with a separation between ownership and control.  Howev-
er, the historical development of company law—specifically in the early 
Company Registration Acts and the continued use of partnership-like 
legal concepts in company law—has meant that large companies have 
not been conceptually severed from partnership-like companies.  Thus, 
company law continues to characterize shareholders in all companies as 
owners. 
V.  CONCLUSION: BERLE AND THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
In the United Kingdom, shareholders continue to be considered the 
owners of companies and the proper recipients of corporate activity, re-
gardless of the level of share dispersal.  This, I have shown, is partly be-
cause of the historical development of company law: the interconnected-
ness of incorporated and unincorporated associations prior to the Bubble 
Act, followed by the dominance of unincorporated forms in the post-
Bubble Act period, resulted in the legal internalization of normative val-
ues into company law that more properly belong to unincorporated asso-
ciations.  This continued even after the law itself had reconceptualized 
the property rights of shareholders so that they were no longer equitable 
owners of the whole undertaking.  Shareholder primacy further devel-
oped when the Company Registration Acts introduced incorporation 
through registration and later allowed members to limit their liability.  In 
the former case, this was because these Acts continued to describe com-
panies in partnership terms, with corresponding implications for owner-
ship; in the latter case, this was because the Acts encouraged small part-
                                                            
 89. See Ireland, supra note 70.  Ireland argues that the reasons for the continuous conception of 
shareholders as owners can be found in the conflict between church and economy over the usury 
laws.  Id. 
 90. Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925] A.C. 619.  Insurable interest is a key 
attribute of owning property.  See generally O. Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections on Company Law 
Reform, 7 MOD. L. REV. 54 (1944). 
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nership-like businesses to become incorporated companies, thus putting 
partnership-like disputes in the common law and legislation developing 
for companies. 
Following Berle’s thesis, this should have changed with the rise of 
dispersed shareholding, but it did not.  For Berle, the changing nature of 
shareholding—severed from assets, personal involvement, and liability—
has certain normative implications.  In illustrating what his normative 
understanding of property ownership is and the nature of shareholding in 
the new setting of large corporations, Berle approvingly quoted German 
minister Walter Rathenau: 
No one is a permanent owner.  The composition of the thousand 
fold complex which functions as lord of the undertaking is in a state 
of flux. . . .  This condition of things signifies that ownership has 
been depersonalized . . . the depersonalization of ownership simul-
taneously implies the objectification of the thing owned.  The 
claims to ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so 
mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it be-
longed to no one; it takes an objective existence.91 
Rathenau clearly indicated, as Berle himself maintained, that the 
shift in the nature of shares—now depersonalized as freely transferable 
intangible assets—has created a corresponding shift in the nature of the 
company itself.  Now the company “takes an objective existence;” it has 
an “un-owned-ness” which has implications for future understandings of 
the claims of shareholders.  The disassociation of shareholders’ claims in 
the company—already understood as distinct from company assets and 
known as the doctrine of separate legal personality—freed the company 
from any overriding obligation to its shareholders.  This “un-owned-
ness” opened opportunities for the company to operate in a socially re-
sponsible fashion. 
But, as the evolution of English companies indicates, the lack of 
“owned-ness” does not necessarily result in corporate social responsibili-
ty and a shift away from shareholder primacy.  Indeed, recent company 
legislation has put directors under a statutory duty to promote the inter-
ests of shareholders.92  The British conception of shareholder primacy, so 
influenced by the normative values of the unincorporated associations 
from which company law emerged, is vastly different than what Berle 
predicted corporations would be like and how he envisioned the nature of 
ownership.  This is partly because share dispersal was not as complete in 
England as it was in the United States at the time of The Modern Corpo-
                                                            
 91. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 92. Companies Act 2006, supra note 62, at § 172. 
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ration.  But it is principally because the notion of shareholders as owners 
(thus deserving primary consideration as an entitlement of that owner-
ship) was too grounded in law, and the historical development of that 
law, to be shifted by such trifling things as the emergence of wide share 
dispersal.  Berle’s new ownership required wider social reform so that it 
could take root.  As I will discuss in a future publication, this was partly 
managed in the context of Britain’s shift to corporatism in the post-war 
period.  It is possible that shareholding in widely-held organizations 
could shift away from the notions of entitlement which underpinned 
shareholder primacy in the United Kingdom; however, this could only 
happen in the context of radical reform in ideology, politics, and gov-
ernment policy. 
 
